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Advanced Squad Leader Rulebook Updated and Erraticized


1. W.1 KOREAN WAR (KW) RULES: The Korean War began on June 25, 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea. Well prior to the invasion, following the liberation of Korea from the Japanese in 1945, a sustained campaign was waged on the peninsula between Communist guerillas and anti-Communist forces. Many of the rules here can be adapted to those actions.

2. W.2A UNITED NATIONS (UN) FORCES: This list excludes UN members who provided only medical units (India, Italy, Norway, and Sweden) but includes the Republic of Korea, which was not technically a member of the UN at the time. Service dates for UN Combatant Forces were:

•Korean National Defense Constabulary: 6/46-8/48

•ROK Army: 9/48-7/53

•Korean Marine Corps: 4/49-7/53

•United States •Army: 7/50-7/53

•Army Airborne: 9/50-7/53

•Army Rangers: 12/50-12/51

•KATUSA: 9/50-7/53

•Marine Corps: 8/50-7/53

•British Commonwealth: 9/50-7/53

•41 Independent Commando, Royal Marines: 9/50-12/51

•Other United Nations Command: 10/50-7/53

3. W.2B COMMUNIST FORCES: Service dates for Communist Forces were:

•Korean People's Army: 2/48-7/53

•Communist Guerillas: 1946-1952

•Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army: 10/50-7/53

4. W.4 EXTREME THAW: The extreme freeze-thaw action of Korea had a detrimental effect on mines, often resulting in their failure to detonate.

5. W.4 GYROSTABILIZERS: U.S. armor commanders did not emphasize proper use of gyrostabilizers, which were often removed or in poor repair.

6. W.6 BAYONET CHARGE: Despite operating in an era of massive firepower, UN forces conducted bayonet charges on several occasions. French, Ethiopian, and Turkish units were particularly known for closing with the enemy in this manner.

7. W.7 VARIABLE TIME (VT) FUZES: Proximity fuzes were referred to as Variable Time (VT) fuzes during WW2 and the Korean War in order to maintain secrecy around the actual technology. Originally developed to shoot down aerial targets more effectively, they incorporate a small sensor that measures distance to a solid object, detonating the warhead at a specified distance above that object. The effect is to optimize the blast and fragmentation pattern, dramatically increasing the lethality of the blast. Proximity fuzes were first available for 105mm howitzer shells, and later for other ammunition.

8. W.8 HEAT VS AF ≥ 6: The actual penetration of a HEAT round was particularly susceptible to the slope of the armor it hit. Part of the ineffectiveness of the M9A1 2.36-inch bazooka (BAZ 45) against the T-34/85 was due to this effect. The Dud-effect in this rule reflects additional variability arising from actual round impact point and armor slope, providing results closer to actual accounts of armor engagements without altering the basic HEAT TK structure of the game, which is based on maximum armor penetration.

9. W.8A BAZOOKA: Rounds for the 2.36-inch bazooka (BAZ 44/45, as well as any BAZ 43 that stray into Korea) came from WW2 stockpiles. The age of these rounds and the resulting degradation contributed substantially to their ineffectiveness against T-34/85s. The additional DRM for these older BAZ provides a simple adjustment. Starting in July 1950, the United States began to introduce the new M20A1 35-inch "Super Bazooka" (BAZ 50), which rapidly proved its effectiveness against the T-34/85 and helped to end the KPA's armored dominance.

10. W.10A POP-UP FLARES: When tripped, a Pop-Up flare fired up into the sky and set off a starshell that then floated down by parachute.

11. 1.3 STEEP HILLS: Difficult even for infantry, Korea's steep hills were nearly impassable for vehicles, greatly restricting the role of armored and mechanized formations during the war.

12. 2.1 U.S. ARMY: Between WW2 and the Korean War, the U.S. Army reorganized its infantry platoons. Instead of a platoon headquarters and three 12-man rifle squads, the new organization had a platoon headquarters, three 9-man rifle squads, and a weapons squad with an M1916A6 LMG and a bazooka. This could have been represented by new American squads with less firepower, a new MMC representing the weapons squad, and a special rule allowing an additional half-squad or so in a location without overstacking. For playability purposes, Forgotten War uses the standard Army MMC with the men and equipment of the weapons squad distributed among the three rifle squads of a platoon.

13. 2.12 RANGERS: After the Korean War started, the U.S. Army organized and trained special Ranger units composed of volunteers, often WW2 combat veterans of various elite units, used for raiding and reconnaissance. Generally. a Ranger Company (Airborne) was attached to each Army division. Rangers may also be used to represent certain ad hoc elite units such as the "Wolfhound Raiders," which were raised in-theater. When Rangers are used as line infantry instead of their intended specialized role, they can either be represented by regular Elite Class MMC or their Self-Rally capability should be NA by SSR.

14. 2.13 KATUSA: KATUSA were composed of conscripted (often times press-ganged) personnel placed within U.S. units in order to fill out or augment those units' TOEs. Although numerous examples of outstanding individuals exist, the men composing these units typically did not speak English (interpreters were often not available), were poorly trained, and were poorly equipped. Most U.S. units integrated small numbers of KATUSA (3-6 men) into each squad, but other units (specifically, some combat support and transportation units, the 24th Infantry Division, one regiment of the 25th Infantry Division) created Korean-only squads and platoons typically led by U.S. officers. (During the Chosin Campaign, Regimental Combat Team 31 had about 40-50 percent KATUSA in their rifle battalions.) KATUSA MMC are provided to represent these Korean-only sub units. As the war progressed, natural attrition and proactive selection by U.S. officers produced a solid cadre of ROK soldiers. Because the KATUSAs were not rotated out as rapidly as U.S. soldiers, they often were the most veteran troops within a unit. KATUSAs became rare after October l952 when 8th Army directed that Korean-only units be disbanded.

15. 2.14 EARLY KW US. ARMY: The first U.S. Army units to enter the Korean War were woefully unprepared for combat. Oriented towards occupation duty in Japan, they had poor physical fitness, little training, and their equipment was ill-maintained. Materiel and supplies were also often in poor condition; many stockpiles had been sitting around uncovered at various locations in Asia and the Pacific since the end of WW2. These Early KW U.S. Army penalties should probably apply to some units even after 8/50.

16. 2.2 US. MARINE CORPS: Late-WW2 and Korean era Marine rifle squads were designed to break down into three four-man fire teams (see Footnote 43 to G17.11). Players wishing to experiment with this approach despite the additional complexity and effects on balance can consider the following guidelines.

When a 7-6-8 squad Deploys (or suffers ELR Replacement), it is exchanged for three 2-4-8 HS (broken if undergoing ELR Replacement). (These are available in RISING SUN.) For stacking and squad-equivalency purposes, a 2-4-8 HS counts as only one-third of a squad and as 3 ⅓ PP for Passenger/Rider purposes. An unarmed 2-4-8 HS re-arms as a 2-4-8. If a 7-6-8 squad suffers Casualty Reduction. there is a 50-50 chance it will lose two 2-4-8 HS; determine randomly. Three 2-4-8 HS are necessary to Recombine into a 7-6-8 squad; two 2-4-8 HS may not recombine. Each 7-6-8 squad is Worth three VP.

17. 2.2 REAR ECHELON: All U.S.M.C. personnel (including pilots) had combat infantry training.

18. 3.2 REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY (ROKA): From 1910 to 1945, Korea was a Japanese colony. After WW2 ended, US troops landed in Korea beginning September 8, 1945 to occupy the area south of the 38th Parallel, while troops from the Soviet Union entered the northern part of the country, to occupy the area north of the 38th Parallel. The stated goal of the American and Soviet occupations was to be temporary, pending the establishment of a permanent national government for the entire country. In brief, what actually happened in 1948 is that a communist regime under Kim Il Sung was established in North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) while an American-leaning government led by Syngman Rhee was formed in South Korea (the Republic of Korea).

The first unit of what became the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) was the 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, Korean Constabulary, which was activated 14 January 1946 and began training at a former Japanese Army barracks on the outskirts of Seoul. Besides the regiment in Seoul, by April 1946, constabulary regiments had been established at Pusan, Kwangju, Taegu, Iri, Taejon, Ch'ongju, and Ch-unch'on—one regiment for each province in South Korea. The Republic of Korea officially proclaimed its establishment on August 15, 1948 and the ROK Department of National Defense, the ROK Army, and ROK Navy became official on December 15, 1948. At this time, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Constabulary Regiments became the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Infantry Divisions. Two months later, the Capital Division was formed from the Capitol Security Command. At the same time the 8th and 11th Infantry Divisions were formed from the two remaining constabulary regiments. The American military advisers to the ROK military were United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG). The ROKA was poorly armed, partly because of the low priority assigned to Korea by American strategy and partly because of fears that Syngman Rhee would attempt to reunify Korea by force if he could. When the Korea War started on June 25, 1950, the ROKA was unprepared for the relentless North Korean attack. The absence of an Elite Class ROKA squad helps represent this. Largely destroyed in the early battles of the war, it was slowly rebuilt with American assistance of three corps, including some armor and artillery.

19. 3.3 REPUBLIC OF KOREA MARINE CORPS (KMC): The Republic of Korea Marine Corps (KMC), established in April 1949, earned a reputation m a tough and highly-motivated unit. Closely associated with its American Marine counterparts, a KMC regiment was attached to the 1st Marine Division and acted as its fourth infantry regiment during part of the Korean War. By 1952, the KMC was operating on its own.

20. 3.31 JAPANESE-ARMED KMC: KMC units were initially armed primarily with Japanese equipment. They were rearmed with U.S. weapons and equipment in preparation for the Inchon landing. Beginning in 1951, the KMC underwent a series of major revision and training programs that brought its cadre and weapons up to standards close to the U.S.M.C.

21. 3.36 KMC OBA: Initially, the KMC did not have any organic artillery, with its indirect fire provided by the U.S.M.C. Eventually, the Americans supplied the necessary weapons and training for the KMC to form its own artillery units.

22. 4.1 BRITISH & COMMONWEALTH ARMIES: Great Britain and the Commonwealth fielded significant forces in Korea. Although initially still armed with Lee-Enfield rifles, Sten sub-machine guns, and Bren and Vickers machine guns, these forces (particularly the Canadians) were increasingly armed with American weapons as the war went on. Compared to the early war U.S. Army, the expeditionary forces of the British and Commonwealth troops were better prepared for combat and should ordinarily be represented by Elite and 1st line units or a mix thereof, with 2nd line MMC reserved for ELR Replacement.  

23. 4.2 ROYAL MARINES: 41 (Independent) Commando, Royal Marines was the only British Commando unit to see action in the war. It was first used as a raiding force in September-October 1950, before being attached to the 1st Marine Division during the Chosin Campaign in November-December. Thereafter, it returned to its raiding role until it was withdrawn from the war at the end of 1951. Clothed and equipped like an American unit, they nonetheless retained their unique green berets.

24. 4.3 CANADIAN ASSAULT FIRE: One battalion of Canadian infantry began serving in Korea in December 1950, with two battalions (from different regiments) joining them later to create the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Each battalion was specially formed from the Canadian Army Special Force—an all-volunteer mixture of WW2 veterans, career soldiers, and new recruits. The Korean War derailed Canadian plans to completely rearm with U.S. designed weapons, and war stocks of WW2 vintage equipment were hastily taken out of storage. The continued use of bolt action rifles was a severe disappointment to the troops in the face of massed Chinese SMGs, and many M1 rifles (semi-automatic) and M2 carbines (automatic) were unofficially obtained through barter with U.S. units. One battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) in 1952 figured it had roughly 50 percent of its infantrymen armed with U.S. weapons. Starting in May 1953, Korean troops began to be introduced into the Canadian Army in Korea. These troops were known as Korean Augmentation Troops to Commonwealth Division (KATCOMs). KATCOMs were integrated directly into rifle squads, with three KATCOMs per ten-man squad. While the Canadians found the same difficulties with language, etc, that U.S. troops had encountered, they also found the boost in manpower beneficial, and numerous KATCOMs saw action with their Canadian units, some becoming casualties. Squads with KATCOMs and those without are identical in game terms.

25. 5.1 OTHER UN COMMAND (OUNC) ARMIES: Many nations sent forces to Korea as part of the UN Command (UNC). We use the term Other United Nations Command (OUNC) for those UN forces that are neither American nor British Commonwealth. OUNC forces were generally equipped with American weapons and equipment. Green troops are excluded due to the more veteran nature of these expeditionary forces.

26. 6.1 KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY (KPA): The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly called "North Korea", called its ground forces the "In Min Gun", best translated as the "Korean Peoples Army" (KPA), although UN documents (and even some Chinese and Soviet sources) consistently refer to the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). The KPA was created in the image of the Soviet Army, which trained, organized, and equipped it (including some instances were Russian advisers on the ground directly led KPA troops in combat). Tough, aggressive, and competent, the KPA was highly successful in its initial attacks. Once the UN began fielding more experienced units and brought their vastly superior resources to bear, the KPA was devastated and played a distinctly secondary role to the CPVA.

27. 6.1 HUMAN WAVE: By the end of WW2, Soviet tactics had evolved such that Human Waves were rare and elite squads were deploying into smaller units. These improved tactics were imparted to the KPA, who often eschewed Human Waves even when presented with the opportunity and whose elite squads may deploy. An SSR should invoke the Human Wave rules (A25.23) when appropriate.

28. 6.3 MASSACRE: The KPA exhibited extreme brutality towards its UN prisoners, with numerous executions and other mistreatments of POWs.

29. 6.5 COMMUNIST GUERILLAS: Between the end of WW2 and the start of the Korean War, North Korea supported extensive guerrilla operations in the south. These ranged from minor, disruptive operations to large insurrections such as the Cheju-Do Rebellion (beginning April 1948) in which nearly 60,000 combatants and civilians died. During the rapid withdrawal from the Pusan Perimeter in September l950, numerous North Korean units completely collapsed, some of which reformed as insurgents and fought a guerrilla war after the UN lines moved north. These guerillas became so problematic that from December 1951 to March 1952, UN Forces conducted a major counterinsurgency operation titled Operation RAT KILLER in which over 25,000 guerillas were killed or captured.

30. 7.1 THE COMMUNIST CHINESE: After the KPA's heavy losses in the campaigns, the People's Republic of China (PRC)—encouraged by their recent victory over the GMD in the Chinese Civil War—assumed the leading Communist role in the Korean War. Chinese forces were called "volunteers" to avoid the implication that China was directly at war with the United States. A throwback in the era of jet fighters and tanks, the Chinese army was a primitive force that moved on foot and relied on the use of mass bodies. Most often of peasant background, the Chinese soldier was able to survive with minimal supplies, could endure the most miserable conditions, and was skilled in field craft.

31. 7.1 CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEER ARMY (CPVA): The armed forces of the PRC were called the People's Liberation Army PLA), but the PRC referred to its forces in Korea (all of which came straight from the PLA) as the Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army (CPVA). This is often shortened to Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) or People's Volunteer Army (PVA), although most UN documents refer to them as Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). Fresh PRC units entered Korea at the start of the first Spring Offensive in April 1951, which is the date used here for the transition from CPVA Initial Intervention units to Soviet-Armed units. Force types were often mixed in battle, however, both before and after this date, depending on the units involved, with Initial Intervention units not completely replaced until very late in 1952.

32. 7.121 GRENADIERS: The CPVA was poorly equipped early on, lacking not only heavy Weapons but sometimes even rifles. Grenadiers represent troops armed primarily with grenades and edged Weapons. They were not organic to the CPVA infantry company but were deliberately organized as lead elements for a planned attack and would rarely, if ever, be found in meeting engagements, ambushes, or on the defence. Grenadiers were assigned to some planned attacks even after the Initial Intervention period but were largely phased out by 1953.

33. 7.21 STEP-REDUCTION: The step-reduction mechanic incorporates three separate attributes: the well-documented steadfastness of CPVA units under fire and in the face of high casualties (due in part to the Communist Party's team-member, cowardice-reporting policy); the lack of effective communications to or call off attacks once started; and unarmed or poorly armed troops in the unit picking up the weapons of their fallen comrades.

34. 7.3 LEADERS: Prior to 1955 the PLA—in keeping with its revolutionary army organizational culture—did not use the normal rank structure typically associated with European-style armies. Instead, leaders were identified by the position they held within their unit: assistant squad leader, squad leader, assistant platoon leader, platoon leader, etc. Therefore, leader counters show only a name. During the post-Korean War modernization, a Soviet-style rank system was adopted, only to be eliminated in 1965, and then reintroduced after the Cultural Revolution.

35. 7.31 POLITICAL OFFICERS (PO): Political Officers (PO) were embedded within CPVA units down to the company level. Ordinarily, at least one PO should be in each CPVA scenario.

36. 7.42 INFANTRY PLATOON MOVEMENT (IPM): Although Korean War-era press and some popular accounts indicate that Chinese attacks were characterized by massed waves of screaming soldiers, this was not true for the most part. CPVA attacks were, however. characteristically relentless, with the troops moving forward even after suffering high numbers of casualties. The CPVA's lack of electronic communications did result in a general lack of tactical flexibility. Although CPVA units were well briefed on their attack plans (down to the soldier level) and would follow orders to the letter, such orders could only be modified by leaders at the company level or above. Well-planned and well-executed CPVA attacks would break down and lose momentum as the battle progressed or when the situation rapidly changed. Once the lines began to stabilize in early 1951, Chinese infiltration and flanking possibilities were reduced, and the CPVA did conduct some high-profile, massive Human Wave attacks (A25.23) that mostly ended in bloody disasters for the Chinese. An SSR should invoke the Human Wave rules when appropriate.

37. 7.5 RECON UNITS: CPVA attacks were typically preceded by extensive reconnaissance of enemy positions, using specially-trained recon platoons. These units (seldom more than 5 percent of any attacking force) would split into 1-3-man teams as they approached enemy lines, infiltrate between positions gathering intelligence, and then reassemble to return to the CPVA lines to help lead the attack.

38. 7.71 EARLY KW CPVA NIGHT: Early in the intervention, CPVA forces exhibited an uncanny ability to move undetected through the Korean countryside. Not only did Chinese armies and divisions mass undetected before attacking UN forces, but small units were consistently able to move rapidly and quietly at night to manoeuvre and infiltrate close to UN units, surrounding positions and achieving tactical surprise. This ability disappeared as UN lines stabilized, night procedures were upgraded, and communication improved.

39. 7.8 BUGLES: The CPVA used bugles, drums, and other musical instruments to assist in command and control both during the day and at night. These instruments, although giving away the CPVA positions, often signalled an impending mass attack and served to unnerve defenders, particularly at night.

40. 7.9 MISCELLANEOUS: The CPVA extensively used civilians as sources of information to identify enemy positions and commonly used civilians as guides to pick hidden routes through the terrain. The CPVA usually infiltrated as close as possible to enemy positions before a major assault (100-200 meters) and liked to attack at night (primarily to avoid UN airpower), sometimes from within enemy perimeters. A Recon dr (E1.23), or even more than one, with a +1 drm can be used to supplement the CPVA's normal Civilian Interrogation benefits.

41. 7.92 ENTRENCHING: CPVA units were, for the most part, composed of men who had labored manually for a living. They exhibited an aptitude for rapidly digging extensive field fortifications when occupying defensive positions.

42. 7.95 CONCEALMENT: The CPVA hid in terrain in a way that other Korean War era armies did not. At times, CPVA units would appear "from nowhere" out of hidden folds in the terrain or out of crops, woods, or buildings.

43. 8. KW AIR SUPPORT: Although the Korea War was the quintessential infantry war, air power played a major supporting role. The predominant daylight close air support aircraft used by the UN in Korea were the F-51D Mustang, F4U-4B & AU-1 Corsair, and AD Skyraider. Early in the war, the North Koreans used Yak-9P fighters and IL-10 attack aircraft, before U.S. air power drove them from the skies.

44. 8.1 AIRCRAFT: The advent of the jet transformed the composition of air forces after WW2. While highly successful in the air superiority and deep interdiction roles, the early jet fighters were less successful in providing close air support. Their thirsty jet engines resulted in less endurance over the battlefield. The jets also required long, clean runways, which meant that they were often based farther from the front lines and were less responsive to requests for close air support. Although less suited to the task, the principal jet fighters used in the war for close air support were the F-80C Shooting Star and F9F-2 (and -4 and -5) Panther and later the F- 84D (and E and G) Thunderjet. F8 Meteors and F-86F Sabres also saw service in this role. The Communists (both Korean and Chinese) used their MiG-15 jets (often manned by Soviet pilots) for air defence, not for close air support. The FB 50 counter represents all UN jet aircraft types.

45. 8.12 AD SKYRAIDER: The premier close air support aircraft of the Korean War was the AD-3 and AD-4 Skyraider, flown by the U.S. Navy and U.S.M.C., it could accurately deliver a massive load of weapons and absorb tremendous punishment.

46. 8.3 VT-FUSED BOMBS: Any general purpose bomb with a VT fuse instead of a standard one is a VT-bomb. It is by design an "area" weapon, using the Area Target Type but with a more powerful effect.

47. 8.4 AFV SAFETY ZONE: By November 1950, the great bulk of North Korea's armor had been destroyed, with any remaining self-propelled artillery batteries (SU-76Ms) limited to a more indirect fire role. Since the CPVA never fielded any armored units, the likelihood that UN pilots would engage UN armored vehicles in a mistaken manner was greatly reduced.

48. 8.5 RESTRICTED AIRSPACE: As tactics were developed to coordinate aircraft and artillery attacks, various methods were used to protect aircraft from incoming artillery rounds and to reduce redundant attacks. These methods were eventually consolidated into structured "fire support coordination measures."

49. 9. FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS & CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: Improvements in technology, techniques, tactics, and procedures during the Korean War enabled a dramatic increase in the ability to coordinate air and artillery support against tactical targets.

50. 9.1 FORWARD AER CONTROLLERS: During the interwar years and into the Korean War, the U.S.M.C. pioneered the development of a sophisticated system to control close air support, resulting in better responsiveness, fewer mistaken attacks, and increased effectiveness. Specially-trained U.S.M.C. personnel supported U.S., KMC, and OUNC operations.

51. 9.11 U.S.M.C. TACP: TACPs consisted of pilots trained as Forward Air Controllers and enlisted communication specialists who coordinated and controlled air strikes in support of ground forces. The U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps employed TACPs differently during the war due to divergent theories of close air support flowing from their WW2 experiences. The U.S.M.C. system was conducted at the tactical level, with the TACP attached to the battalion; air support was closely coordinated with front line units, including some Army units. The system of close air support used by the Air Force and Army, on the other hand, was coordinated and controlled at the operational level, with the TACP attached to the division, Where they served more as an air liaison-outside the scope of ASL.

52. 9.13 AIRBORNE FAC: Airborne FACs in light aircraft also were part of the air support control system. U.S. Air Force FACs primarily flew in T-6 Texan trainers. Marine pilots and observers in OY-2 Sentinels provided similar missions, as did those in F4U Corsairs. The latter, being an actual FB, could defend itself in Aerial Combat (contrary to 9.13).

53. 10. SEARCHLIGHTS: Searchlights (SL) in WW2 were primarily intended for anti-aircraft detection, and searchlight units were assigned to anti-aircraft artillery formations. After the Allies achieved air superiority towards the end of the war, SL saw some limited use in ground combat. SL, sometimes operated by engineer units, saw more frequent ground combat use in the Korean War, where UN forces used different types of SL to illuminate the battlefield during night actions.

54. 10.13 AFV-MOUNTED SEARCHLIGHTS: To help counter CPVA night attacks, UN forces added SL to certain AFV to supplement the existing truck- and carriage-mounted SL. Thinly-armored 18" SL were mounted on the gun mantel above the main gun of the M46 Patton and the Centurion Mk III tanks, while the Canadian M4A3E8 Sherman mounted a 14" SL. Equipped with a shutter to quickly douse the light, SL proved very effective for illuminating enemy bunkers, MG emplacements, and other suspected positions. U.S.M.C. tankers typically operated in pairs. While one tank spotted and illuminated an enemy position, the second tank, hidden in darkness, would fire several rounds in rapid succession, minimizing the exposure of the illumination tank. The operations utilizing AFV-mounted SL in early August 1952 proved so effective that these tanks became a priority target for Chinese artillery.

55. 10.131 AMSL MALFUNCTION: Korean War SL were extremely fragile (especially their filaments). Any severe vibration or abrupt movement could damage the filament or the searchlight mechanism: firing the MA/CMG/SA on a vehicle equipped with a vehicular-mounted SL inevitably caused the SL to malfunction.

56. 10.221 HINDRANCE EFFECTS: Anybody who has driven at night in heavy snow or fog and turned on the high beams has experienced a version of this phenomenon.

57. 10.23 SL HEX EFFECTS: An operating SL highlights its Location as long as the SL is not pointing directly at the firer.

58. 10.25 IB BLINDNESS: Looking back toward a SL was extremely disorientating and could effectively "blind" firers looking in that direction, both at intervening targets and the SL itself.

59. 10.44 TRACKING: Unlike ordinary weapons, a SL "fires" a continuous beam of light, which maintains illumination on a target.

60. 10.52 VOLUNTARY CANCELLATION: SL typically shut down their lamp in order to regain the protective cover of darkness when under attack (or expecting an attack) and often stopped illuminating an area once all targets were out of commission or LOS.

61. 10.6 SLBI: The concept of "artificial moonlight" was introduced in WW1, and saw some use in both WW2 and Korea. With proper preparation, multiple SL would be arranged to bounce beams of light off low clouds to create a semi-daylight effect over the battlefield.